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Abstract
I discuss and compare alternative approaches to integrating bounded rationality with the theory
of economic organization, concentrating on the organizational capabilities approach, which is
strongly influenced by the works of Nelson and Winter, organizational economics, particularly
transaction cost economics, and, finally, a small subset of the literature on biases to judgment
and cognition. I argue that, contrary to the conventional view, both the organizational
capabilities approach and transaction cost economics treat bounded rationality rather “thinly,”
the former being in actuality more taken up with organizational routines than individual
boundedly rational behavior, the latter only invoking bounded rationality to the extent that it
helps explaining incompleteness of contracting.  The rich literature on cognitive biases, etc.
suggests a “thick” approach to bounded rationality that may be helpful with respect to furthering
the theory of economic organization. Examples pertaining to the internal organization of firms
are provided.
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“Nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our research
methods than our view of the nature of the human beings whose behavior we are studying”
(Herbert Simon 1985: 303).
I. Introduction
Few concepts in social science come with such a number of interpretations, connotations, and
diverse modeling efforts as bounded rationality.  This is quite confusing, and makes it necessary
to confront users of the concept with questions as to whether they are talking about Newell and
Simon’s work on heuristic search, or Selten’s aspiration adaptation theory, or Lipman or
Rubinstein’s axiomatic foundations for bounded rationality, or regularities established in
experimental psychological research, or another one of the great number of different  indeed,
very different  variations on Simon’s Grand Theme.  Not only is there is very little agreement
on what the concept means  apart from vague phrases such as that “man is intendedly rational,
but only limitedly so” , there is also substantial disagreement as to what exactly it implies with
respect to understanding the behavior and organization of firms. Nevertheless, many contributors
to the theory of economic organization  from Roy Radner over Oliver Williamson to Richard
Nelson and Sidney Winter  see it as a crucial ingredient in their work.  Some have argued that
it is the key shared assumption between the evolutionary or organizational capabilities theory of
the firm and transaction cost that makes these approaches differ relative to mainstream
economics (e.g., Winter 1988).  This has even prompted speculations that this supposed
similarity may assist in bringing the two approaches closer together (e.g., Brousseau 2000).
The present paper discusses various strategies for incorporating bounded rationality in the theory
of economic organization.  Three such strategies are discussed, namely those associated with the
organizational capabilities approach, organizational economics, and a third yet-to-be-developed
approach in which the rich literature on biases to judgment and cognition is utilized for
developing insights into efficient economic organization.  As befits a contribution to a
conference in honor of Nelson and Winter, particular attention is devoted to their treatment of
bounded rationality in the context of firm organization and behavior  a treatment that Selten
(1990: 649) characterized as having “… brought new impulses to the modeling of boundedly
rational behavior in economics.”   I also discuss the many ramifications of their analysis in the
works of a host of other writers in the organizational capabilities approach. This approach is
quite often seen as an approach to the theory of the firm that puts more of an emphasis on
bounded rationality than is the case in, notably, transaction cost economics (e.g., Fransman 1994;
Conner and Prahalad 1996; Marengo et al. 2000).
However, I shall argue that to the extent that economists of organization as well as business
administration scholars wish to provide more room for considerations of bounded rationality in
the theory of economic organization, they are not necessarily best served by the Nelson and
Winter (1982) approach and its modern ramifications in the organizational capabilities approach
(see also Witt 2001).  I take this approach to be primarily characterized by an emphasis on
1) routinized action and 2) aggregate entities, notably organizational routines and capabilities.
Given this, I argue, first, that the organizational capabilities approach is more about tacit
knowledge embodied in routines and capabilities than it is about bounded rationality per se.
Bounded rationality and tacit knowledge do not logically imply each other. Second, the
organizational capabilities approach has no clear implications with respect to the key issues of
the existence and boundaries of the firm; it also treats internal organization in a too primitive
way. This is because it does not examine how the costs of exchange influence contracting  
and in fact was never constructed for this purpose.  The two arguments are related, I argue, for
1the former is the cause of the latter (Section II, “Bounded Rationality in the Organizational
Capabilities Approach”). 1
The modern economics of organization is, of course, all about comparative contracting; however,
this body of theory has its own problems with bounded rationality. To the extent that it makes
use of bounded rationality at all, it is in a strongly watered-down version in which bounded
rationality is simply invoked to lend credence to contractual incompleteness, and little more.  Its
role seems to be largely rhetorical.  In fact, the role of bounded rationality in producing the
fundamental implications of transaction cost economics, for example, with respect to the
influence of asset specificity on the boundaries of the firm, is unclear, as recent debate suggests
(Section III, “Bounded Rationality in the Modern Economics of Organization”).
Both the organizational capabilities approach and the economics of organization only focus on
one aspect of boundedly rational behavior, and, particularly in the case of the economics of
organization, threat this in a highly abstract or “anonymous” manner. However, it is in fact
possible to begin from richer and less anonymous conceptualizations of bounded rationality, and
build much more directly on these.  One possible approach is to explore to a larger extent
Simonian ideas on heuristic search and problem-solving.  This has been discussed, from very
different perspectives, by writers such as MacLeod (2000) and Marengo et al. (2000).   Another
approach, and the one that I shall primarily discuss, begins from the literature on cognitive and
judgmental biases, associated with such names as Tversky, Kahneman, Thaler and others.  This
latter approach essentially argues that biases to human judgment and cognition are not only
persistent aspects of individual behavior (although eductive efforts may reduce the severity of
the biases); they are also key sources of frictions in contractual relations broadly conceived.  In
other words, they are key determinants of transaction costs, and therefore have implications for
economic organization.  In order to strengthen the case that a different approach to bounded
rationality and economic organization may begin from this literature, I offer concrete examples
pertaining to internal organization (Section IV, “Bounded Rationality and Economic
Organization: Where a Different Approach May Start”).
II. Bounded Rationality in the Organizational Capabilities Approach
Briefly on the Nature and Origins of the Organizational Capabilities Approach
What I here call the “organizational capabilities approach” takes its name after chapter five in
Nelson and Winter (1982), and should be taken as a shorthand for a relatively unified set of
approaches to the behavior and organization of firms that all include Nelson and Winter (1982)
as a key source of inspiration. The set includes capabilities, dynamic capabilities, and
competence approaches, as well as some instances of the resource-based approach, and, of
course, the “evolutionary theory of the firm.”2 These approaches share a number of
characteristics, most obviously an emphasis on experiential, localized knowledge and learning
processes as a key aspect of the firm, as well as a tendency to harshly criticize the economics of
organization, in particular (and for basically unexplained reasons), the notion of opportunism.3
                                                
1
  Williamson (2000) also criticizes the organizational capabilities approach.  The present critique is more radical
than Williamson’s.
2
  Some representative authors are Richardson (1972), Connor (1991), Langlois (1992), Foss (1993), Fransman
(1994), and Connor and Prahalad (1996).
3  Like original sin, critiques of organizational economics keep coming back.  I have sinned myself on
previous occasions, for example, Foss (1993, 1998).
2As Langlois and Foss (1999) point out, these approaches are also united in their attempt to
increasingly go beyond their traditional explananda of explaining the sources of competitive
advantage, localized innovative activity, and general rigidity of firm behavior to also include
issues, notably the boundaries of the firm, that have traditionally been considered the turf of the
more mainstream economics of organization. At the heart of these stories are the characteristics,
notably tacitness, of the knowledge that is embedded in organizational capabilities (Kogut and
Zander 1992; Langlois 1992).  Some vaguely specified mechanism is supposed to link these
characteristics to the boundaries of the firm.
It is quite common to interpret this literature as an attempt to provide more room for bounded
rationality than is standard fare in the economics of organization (e.g., Conner and Prahalad
1996; Fransman 1994; Foss 1998).  However, it is seldom made clear in exactly what sense the
organizational capabilities literature may be characterized as starting from bounded rationality.
Because bounded rationality is, unfortunately, a concept that comes with an legacy of diverse
and even conflicting interpretations, it does matter where exactly one starts from and it is simply
uninformative to say that the organizational capabilities approach builds on bounded rationality,
unless one specifies what kind of bounded rationality.   The organizational capabilities approach
builds on numerous sources, such as the works of Philip Selznick, Alfred Chandler, Edith
Penrose, G.B. Richardson  and Nelson and Winter (1982) (see Foss 1997 for a sampling).
However, of these sources, Nelson and Winter are the only ones to explicitly address and
incorporate bounded rationality. Understanding the extent to which the organizational
capabilities approach builds on a foundation consisting of bounded rationality requires that we
take a look at Nelson and Winter.
Nelson and Winter: Revitalizing and Extending the Behavioral Approach
Nelson and Winter’s most important and celebrated publication, An Evolutionary Theory of
Economic Change, has arguably appealed more to business administration and management
(particularly strategy) scholars than to economists.4  One paper after another, in such fields as
strategy, organizational learning and organizational behavior, have generously cited the book,
particularly the three chapters (3 to 5) that deal with issues pertaining to individual and
organizational behavior and capabilities.  This is not surprising: Re-reading the chapters makes
one realize that not so much has happened in more than a decade’s work on capabilities,
competence, evolutionary, etc. theories of the firm that goes substantially beyond Nelson and
Winter’s treatment.  Contributors to this set of ideas have often treated Nelson and Winter (1982)
not only as a source of inspiration, but as a foundation.  At first sight this may appear somewhat
surprising, given that building a distinct theory of the firm was never the intention of Nelson and
Winter (1982).5  However, what may appeal to writers within the organizational capabilities
approach is the attempt in that book to treat in a unified fashion bounded rationality and tacit
knowledge and at the same time place these in a social context  all of which converges in a
single, highly intuitively plausible concept, namely that of “routine.”
Quite early in Nelson and Winter (1982), namely when discussing “the need for an evolutionary
theory,” the authors observe that their “… basic critique of orthodoxy is connected with the
bounded rationality problem” (p.36). Given this, it is not surprising that they establish direct
links, and are strongly indebted, to the behavioralist notion that short and medium run firm
                                                
4
 See the citation analysis in Meyer (2001).
5
  At the Academy of Management Meetings in Toronto, August 2000, Sidney Winter, in a major address, insisted
that there is no theory of the firm in Nelson and Winter (1982).
3behavior is determined by relatively simple decision rules (Cyert and March 1963).6 They also
make use of behavioralist models of satisficing search. However, they go significantly beyond
behavioralism by examining populations of firms with differing decision rules, by addressing the
interplay between changing external environments and changing decision rules, and by trying to
bring bounded rationality together with tacit knowledge. Given that ideas on organizational
capabilities are now so much part of the discourse in the economics of organization, strategy and
organizational behavior, it is easy to miss the significance of the three chapters, and not realize in
how many ways they extend and indeed revitalize the behavioralist approach.
Nelson and Winter’s main problem with “orthodox” theory, and particularly the neoclassical
theory of the firm, does not appear to be that this theory rules out diversity in terms of productive
or organizational capabilities between firms in an industry per se (as some contributors to the
organizational capabilities approach have argued, e.g., Conner 1991).  Indeed, that theory do
allow for variety in these dimensions.  For example, to the extent that differences in how well
(“competently”) a firm is run reflects owners’ on the job consumption, and these owners are able
and willing to bear the consequences of this consumption (Demsetz 1997), the neoclassical
theory of the firm allows for differential competencies to exist in equilibrium.  One may also
simply postulate differential initial endowments of some costly-to-copy resources, so that firms
with differential efficiencies may exist in equilibrium.  However, the main point of Nelson and
Winter’s critique is that in mainstream economics, heterogeneity is at best exogeneously
determined (as in the cases of differing preferences for on the job consumption or different initial
endowments).  To paraphrase their argument, in the setting of the (basic) neoclassical theory of
the firm, it has to be in this way, because the production set is assumed to be not only given (or
at best changing through given technological progress functions or similar constructs), but also
to be fully transparent.  The implication, as Demsetz (1991) notes, is that if information costs are
thus assumed to be zero, what one firm can do on the level of production, another firm can do
equally well.
Unlike Demsetz, Nelson and Winter do not cast their argument in terms of the information (and
other) costs of copying rival firms’ resource endowments.  Instead, they devote a whole chapter
(4) to an analysis of skills.  By a skill, they mean “… a capability for a smooth sequence of
coordinated behavior that is ordinarily effective relative to its objectives, given the context in
which it normally occurs” (1982: 73).  The attractions of the notion of skill are apparent.  First,
it provides a way of introducing dynamics on the level of production, since skills need to be
nurtured and tend to grow with practice.  Second, it provides a direct link to the behavioralist
notion that behavior is strongly guided by relatively rigid decision rules. This serves to
underscore Nelson and Winter’s critique of maximization in the sense of forward-looking,
informed deliberate choice.  They put much emphasis on this, noting that  “…the sort of choice
that takes place in the process of exercising a skill is choice without deliberation” (p. 82),
although they are careful to note that the behavioral “programs” embodied in skills may be
initiated through deliberate choice. Third, it allows them to bring considerations of tacit
knowledge into the picture and to develop a strong critique of the “blueprint” view of
neoclassical production function theory.  Fourth, it helps them to establish a link between
individual action and organizational behavior. That link is initiated in a rather straightforward
way by the observation that “… directly relevant to our development here is the value of
individual behavior as a metaphor for organizational behavior” (1982: 72; emphasis in original).
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  Winter (1964b) wrote an early and favorable review of Cyert and March (1963).  In a later paper (Winter 1986),
he  was quite explicit about the behavioral nature of the theory in Nelson and Winter (1982).
4In turn, “organizational behavior” is addressed in terms of “routines” that serve as direct
(metaphorical) equivalents to individual skills.  Like skills, routines represent stable sequences of
actions (i.e., they coordinate actions) that are triggered by certain stimuli in certain contexts and
which, in a sense, serve as memories for the organizations that embody them.  However, because
routines are social phenomena, they go beyond the skill metaphor and raise issues of motivation
and coordination.  However, Nelson and Winter sidestep the motivation issue, arguing that
routines represent “organizational truces,” another idea going directly back to Cyert and March
(1963).
In sum, a lot  and perhaps too much   is packed into the notion of routine, including a
variety of behaviors, organizational processes and arrangements, cognitive issues (e.g.,
“organizational memories”), and incentives.7  Nelson and Winter defend this by noting that, in
actuality, “… skills, organization, and ‘technology’ are intimately intertwined in a functioning
routine, and it is difficult to say where one aspect ends and another begins” (1982: 104).
Although it is probably true that the boundaries are blurred, it is not clear why one isn’t excused,
for purposes of analytical clarity, to look at one aspect at a time.  It is one thing to claim that
ontologically, things are a mess.  It is another thing to openly admit the mess into analysis.  This
is perhaps only a minor problem for Nelson and Winter: Because their level of analysis lies
higher than the firm, they can afford to keep the firm level messy.  But their all-inclusive notion
of routine has arguably contributed to the confusion in the literature since their book, which has
been plagued by difficulties of giving precise content to the notion of routines (cf. Cohen et al.
1996) (not to mention “capabilities”).
Bounded Rationality in Nelson and Winter
At first glance, bounded rationality appears to be quite crucial to Nelson and Winter’s argument
(Fransman 1994).  Thus, firm members can only learn routines through practicing them; routines
are simply repeated until they become too dysfunctional; learning is myopic, search is
satisficing; etc. All of these very strong  and perhaps too strong  claims would seem to
install quite prominent places for a rationality that is very bounded indeed.  However, having (re-
)read chapters 3 to 5 in Nelson and Winter, one is left with the feeling that what ultimately
interests them is not really bounded rationality per se in the sense of a commitment to
investigating specific models of boundedly rational individual behavior and tracing the effects of
these on organizational outcomes. What interests them is rather tacit knowledge and its
embodiment in their firm-level analogy to individual skills, namely routines, and how working
with these notions assists the understanding of sluggish organizational adaptation.  In fact, to put
it a bit provocatively, it is not clear that they even need bounded rationality for the purpose of
understanding such adaptation; if organizational members do not hold the same tacit knowledge,
this may be sufficient to explain sluggishness,  because of costly communication.    Let me try to
substantiate some of these assertions.
Bounded rationality has a bad reputation for being used as a sort of catch-all category that can
“explain” all observed deviations from maximizing rationality (Conlisk 1996; Casson and
Wadeson 1997).  The Simon dictum that man is “intendedly rationality, but only limitedly so” is
an example.  It is almost completely vacuous  (and therefore non-predictive)  unless it is
coupled with other assumptions.  This is where the link to Cyert and March (1963) and the skill
metaphor of organizational behavior become important, for it is these additional ideas that allow
Nelson and Winter to work out what is in principle a predictive theory of firm behavior. But
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  See also Winter (1986: 165) for a sophisticated further discussion and defence of this.
5predictive ability has been obtained by adding additional assumptions about the skill-like
dimensions of organizational behavior, rather than going into a analysis of the structure of
boundedly rational decision making per se.  To be sure, Nelson and Winter do mention and
discuss bounded rationality to the extent that this helps them introducing the behavioralist notion
of decision rules.  Clearly such decision rules may be analyzed as manifestations of bounded
rationality.  However, agent level decision rules say nothing in themselves about organizational
behavior.  What permits the link to be established is the use of the skill metaphor.  The
aggregation problem, which is quite problematic in the presence of the variety of behaviors
implied by the notion of bounded rationality, is, if not entirely suppressed, then to a certain
extent sidestepped, by means of the analogy from skills to organizational routine.  Thus, the
whole construct works from an initial assumption about bounded rationality, goes from there to
behavioralist decision rules, combines this with ideas on tacit knowledge as embodied in skilled
behavior, and then transfers individually bounded rationality and skills to the level of routines
and organizational capabilities.
In addition to the various problems pointed out in the Cohen et al. (1996) symposium on the
meaning of routines, there are at least two further problematic consequences of this exercise.
First, tacit knowledge and bounded rationality become indiscriminately lumped together. It is
important to stress that tacit knowledge and bounded rationality represent different kinds of
assumptions and do not necessarily imply each other.  Thus, there can be tacit rules for
maximization, as Machlup (1946) argued. Or, agents can cope with bounded rationality by
means of fully explicit operating procedures.  While one can certainly construct an argument that
boundedly rational agents make use of experientially produced  and “skilled”  decision rules
that are likely to embody a good deal of tacit knowledge, there is no necessary connection
between bounded rationality and tacit knowledge.  Second, and perhaps more seriously,
individually bounded rationality becomes suppressed.   For example, it is not clear in principle
whether organization-level routinization is produced by interaction effects among the members
of a team or whether it is ultimately founded in aspects of individual cognition (Egidi 2000: 2).
In other words, there is no clearly identified mechanism that aggregates from individual behavior
to routines and organizational behavior (Foss and Foss 2000a).8
In the end, bounded rationality is more a sort of background argument that  in combination
with other assumptions about tacit knowledge and skilled human behavior  serves to make
plausible the notion of organizational routine (including search routines), and therefore the
sluggish organizational adaptation that is crucial in Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary story.  In
fact, it is the concept of routine, rather than individual bounded rationality that is centerstage in
their discussion.9  There is nothing wrong with this per se.  For the purposes of Nelson and
Winter (1982) it is perfectly rational.  However, as I argue next, transferring the notions of
routines and the derived concept of organizational capability to other purposes may be highly
problematic.
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 Later work in the evolutionary economics is not to the same extent vulnerable to this charge, notably the work of
Egidi (e.g., 2000), Marengo et al, (2000),  Warglien (e.g., 1995).  
9
 Moreover, those who are not committed to behavioralism may point out that even if one wishes to keep
organizational routines central, it is not so obvious how essential bounded rationality really is. This may be argued
in a number of ways.  One can have perfectly rational standard operating procedures.  It is possible to tell a story in
which different routines in a population of firms emerge as solutions to appropriately specified games being played
in each firms and with agents acting in a maximizing manner. Search behavior is easily reconciled with
maximization. It is perfectly possible to tell sophisticated maximization stories about agents following rigid routines
and procedures, once a full account is made of all relevant costs (e.g., costs of memorizing, depositing, retrieving,
etc. information) (Casson and Wadeson 1997; Foss and Foss 2000b).
6The Organizational Capabilities Approach and Economic Organization
The argument here is that certain characteristics of Nelson and Winter (1982) were carried over
into the organizational capabilities approach, characteristics that are quite appropriate for the
purpose of building a theory of rigidity in firm behavior as a part of a broader evolutionary story,
but which are much less appropriate for the purpose of building a theory of economic
organization.10   These characteristics have been discussed above.  They are the strong emphasis
on aggregate entities, notably routines and organizational capabilities, an emphasis that comes at
the expense of attention to individual behaviors.  This emphasis derives from Nelson and
Winter’s attempt to establish a metaphorical solution to the aggregation problem of moving from
the level of the agent to the level of the organization. Because they fully recognize the
metaphorical character of this maneuver, they don’t commit the mistake of conflating an
ontological claim with a useful research heuristic. Later contributors to the organizational
capabilities approach may not have been as careful here as Nelson and Winter.
The problems seem to emerge rather unavoidably as soon as ideas on organizational routines and
capabilities are transferred from their original place in the analysis of a population of firms to an
analysis of the behavior and, particularly, organization of individual firms.  While these notions
have indeed been of value for the understanding of, for example, the sources of competitive
advantage (although much of this literature is also plagued by conceptual ambiguity), their
application to economic organization is more problematic.
For example, the much cited Kogut and Zander (1992) paper essentially argues directly from the
tacit knowledge embodied in organizational capabilities to the boundaries of the firm.  The
supporting argument is simply that “firms know more than their contracts can tell”.  However,
there is no attempt to address this is in terms of comparative contracting.   What exactly is it that
cannot be written in contracts?  Even if writing costs in fact are prohibitive, why cannot
relational contracting, involving highly incomplete contracts, between independent parties
handle the transfer of knowledge?  Why is it only vertical integration that economizes with what
are presumably writing and communication costs?  No compelling answers are given to such
questions.  This is the case of most of this literature as it applied to economic organization.  A
partial exception is the work of Langlois (1992).  Langlois attempts to supply the missing
mechanism from organizational capabilities to the boundaries of the firm by means of the
concept of ”dynamic transaction costs,” which are essentially communication costs that arise
because of ”dis-similar” (Richardson 1972) capabilities in a vertical structure of firms.
Presumably efficient economic organization minimizes such costs (as well as other more
”traditional” transaction costs, allowance being made for possible tradeoffs between these).
However, this idea may imply another difficulty, one that is also present in Nelson and Winter
(1982) and in virtually all of the organizational capabilities literature. This difficulty is that
knowledge inside firms is assumed be homogenous (or at least not very costly to communicate),
while knowledge between firms (“differential capabilities”) is taken to be (very) heterogeneous
(and therefore costly to communicate).   Thus, Winter (1986: 175) assumes that “… the search
for information from external sources does not proceed with the same ease as for internal
sources.”  If this weren’t the case, it is hard to see how communication costs could carry
implications for the boundaries of the firm.  Although there may be some intuitive appeal to the
assumption, it is hard to accept that it should be generally true.  There are many examples of
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 Foss (1996) discusses other problems with organizational capabilities theories as theories of economic
organization.
7firms where the bandwidth of the communication channels between some business unit of the
firm and external firm (e.g., buyer or seller) is much higher than the bandwidth between the unit
and, say, corporate headquarters. Moreover, the implicit assumption that knowledge in
hierarchies can be taken, at least as a first approximation, to be communicable at zero cost makes
it hard to understand hierarchical organization, since with zero cost communication the
managerial task has no economic rationale (Demsetz 1991; Casson 1994).
However, it is easy to see that such an assumption easily slips into the analysis when the units of
analysis are routines or organizational capabilities.  It is then easy to postulate that “firms know
more than their contracts can tell” and that all organizational aspects are “intertwined in a
functioning routine.” If instead the analysis had started from individual choice behavior, the
argument that communication costs within, for example, certain business units may be lower
than the communication costs between people in the unit and people in a supplier firm, might
have been derived as an outcome of a properly specified model instead of being postulated.  This
is an indication that the emphasis on aggregate entities characteristic of the organizational
capabilities approach makes a micro-analytic understanding of economic organization difficult.
Summing Up
To conclude, the main point of this section has been that the fundamental job for bounded
rationality in Nelson and Winter (1982) is to supply arguments for invoking routines on the
organizational level, and that boundedly rational individual behavior is not a central concern.
Bounded rationality cannot do the job alone; other assumptions are necessary, and these become
more central in their analysis than bounded rationality.  In the hands of many of the followers of
Nelson and Winter in the organizational capabilities approach, even less room is made for
bounded rationality; what is all-important to these writers is rather tacit knowledge embodied in
capabilities (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992).  However, because writers in the organizational
capabilities approach devote little attention to individual choice behavior, their treatment of
economic organization proceeds in terms of postulating somewhat crude causal relations
between capabilities and economic organization, little attention being paid to the microanalytic
issues involved.  They are correspondingly vulnerable to simple critiques from the perspective of
comparative contracting (Foss 1996; Williamson 2000).
It turns out that much of the organizational capabilities approach is vulnerable to much the same
critique that Winter (1991) forcefully launched against the neoclassical theory of the firm.
Specifically, and borrowing directly from Winter, it is in potential “conflict with methodological
individualism” (p.181) (because of the emphasis on routines and organizational capabilities), “…
provides no basis for explaining economic organization” (p.183) (because transaction costs and
comparative contracting are not considered), lacks “realism” (because of its “unrealistic”
treatment of decision-making as entirely guided by routines), and provides a “simplistic
treatment of its  focal concern” (e.g., because it is simply assumed that it is easier to gather,
combine, source, etc. knowledge inside firms than between firms). The main underlying
problem, it has been argued here, is that too little attention is devoted to boundedly rational
individual decision-making.  As I argue next, in organizational economics, bounded rationality
has a similarly weak role, though for very different reasons.  This gives rise to somewhat similar
problems.  Here, too, it is in actuality a background argument that in combination with other
assumptions helps to rationalize other, supposedly more central, phenomena.  And as recent
theoretical debate has suggested (e.g., Tirole 1999), it is not clear whether those stories that
claim to rely on bounded rationality in order to be able to explain key aspects of economic
organization can actually accomplish this.
8III.  Bounded Rationality in the Modern Economics of Organization
Bounded Rationality: Spanners in the Works of Complete Contracting
Although the economics of organization may have been one of the first areas where the notion of
bounded rationality was systematically applied in theorizing, later developments do not seem to
have gone significantly beyond Simon (1951), Marschak and Radner (1972) and Williamson
(1975).  If anything, the use, or at least invocation, of the notion of bounded rationality may
actually have declined.11   To some extent this is because the economics of organization has
developed into a highly formal and axiomatic enterprise, and bounded rationality has a bad
reputation of only being given to formalization if that formalization is fundamentally ad hoc and
the axiomatic basis is unclear or non-existent.  That reputation may not be entirely justified
(Rubinstein 1998), but most economists of organization (particularly contract theorists) certainly
act as if it is justified.  Oliver Hart (1990: 700-1) sums up the sentiments of many formal
economists when he argues that
… I do not think that bounded rationality is necessary for a theory of organizations.
This is fortunate because developing a theory of bounded rationality in a bilateral or
multilateral setting seems even more complicated than developing such a theory at the
individual level; and the latter task has already proved more than enough for
economists to handle.12
In fact, some parts of the economics of organization, particularly contract theory, bear little
substantial imprint of bounded rationality.13  Its only real job, if it is used at all, is to rationalize
in a highly intuitive way why some contingencies may be left out of a contract  (Milgrom and
Roberts 1992).  It is sometimes argued that transaction cost economics provides more room for
bounded rationality than simply this (e.g., Brousseau 2000).  There is something to this claim;
for example, Williamson (1975) invokes bounded rationality in connection with, for example,
explaining the M-form. Arguably, however, Williamson is more interested in making use of
bounded rationality for the purpose of explaining the existence and boundaries of firms than for
the purposes of explaining administrative behavior, as in Simon (1947).  And for this purpose,
boundedly rational behavior itself is not really modeled.
Instead, bounded rationality enters organizational economics reasoning in a loose background
sort of way, in which it lends credence to exogenously imposing constraints on the feasible
contracting space, but is not modeled itself.  It supplies the rhetorical function of lending
intuitive support to the notion of incomplete contracts.  A Simonian information processing
argument is sometimes invoked here (Hart 1990: 698; Schwartz 1992: 80).  Thus, if agents do
not have the mental capacity to think through the whole decision tree  for example, in
complicated bilateral trading relations , it seems reasonable to assume that some of the
branches of the tree (such as those relating to some future uses of assets) cannot be represented
in a contract; the contract is left incomplete.  However, agents are supposed to deal with this
manifestation of bounded rationality in a substantively rational manner, as many critics have
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  For example, in Williamson’s work, bounded rationality loomed larger in Williamson (1975) than it does in
Williamson (1996).
12
  It should perhaps be added that Hart’s (1990) notion of what constitutes a “theory of organizations” is quite
limited:  It is a theory of the boundaries of the firm!
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 For example, rational expectations are very important to most contract theory models. Applying the notion of BR
to expectations formation would imply that much contracting would produce unintended consequences, producing a
need for ex post governance (Williamson 1996), but this is not explored in contract theory.
9pointed out since Dow (1987).  Thus, the real function and importance of bounded rationality is
actually quite limited in the modern economics of organization, even in those parts that purport
to actively make use of it.
Because bounded rationality tends to be simply used as convenient spanners in the works of
incomplete contracting, we are seldom or never given deep explanations in the economics of
organization of what it actually is.  For example, in a central chapter (5, “Bounded Rationality
and Private Information”) in their well-known textbook, Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1992:
128) define bounded rationality as a matter of ”[l]imited foresight, imprecise language, the costs
of calculating solutions and the costs of writing down a plan.” They go on to develop at length
the implications of this in terms of imperfect contracts and subsequent problems of imperfect
commitment between contractual parties.  However, they do not develop or truly explain their
definition of bounded rationality; it is merely a label for a convenient deviation from the “fully
rational” contracting outcome. As Dow (1987) observed, these kinds of treatments of bounded
rationality provoke a lurking suspicion of a basic inconsistency, for whereas bounded rationality
is loosely invoked as a background assumption (yet still a necessary one), there is no hesitation
to appeal to substantive rationality when the choice between governance structures must be
rationalized.14  I discuss this next.
Bounded Rationality, Transaction Costs and Economic Organization: The Incomplete
Contract Controversy
A recent theoretical debate on the coherence and foundations of incomplete contract theory 
the ”incomplete contract controversy” (Tirole 1999)   is quite pertinent to the issues under
consideration here. As the name indicates, the debate concerns whether satisfactory foundations
for incomplete contracts are offered in the works of Oliver Hart and associates (e.g., Grossman
and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995).  The main critics are Eric Maskin and Jean
Tirole (Maskin and Tirole 1999; Tirole 1999).  At the core of this debate is the explanatory
tension between invoking transaction costs   which may be understood as  a consequence of
bounded rationality   on the one hand and postulating farsighted and substantively rational
contracting on the other hand.   However, whereas Dow (1987) interpreted this as an
inconsistency in transaction cost economics, Maskin and Tirole show something else: There is
no formal inconsistency; however, the use of transaction costs (i.e., bounded rationality) does not
provide additional explanatory insight relative to models that make no use of these.
Organizational issues have largely motivated the upsurge in incomplete contract modeling during
the last decade.  In fact, the founding incomplete contract paper, namely Grossman and Hart
(1986), was explicitly motivated by an attempt to model the emphasis in transaction cost
economics on asset specificity as a key determinant of the scope of the firm, using modeling
conventions and insights already developed in (complete contracting) agency theory and its basis
in mechanism design theory. However, whereas Williamson (1996) puts much emphasis on
inefficient ex post bargaining, the incomplete contracting approach assumes that ex post
bargaining is efficient.15  Thus, what drives these models are misaligned ex ante incentives,
particularly with respect to investment in vertical buyer-supplier relationships. The problem is to
motivate what may cause such misalignment. The kind of (complete) contracting studied in
agency theory also will not do.  Under this kind of contracting, agents can perfectly 1) foresee
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  This asymmetry is discussed in greater detail in Foss and Foss (2000a) and Foss (2001).
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 These bargaining costs are not considered in the Maskin and Tirole critique.  It is therefore unclear to exactly what
extent their critique pertains to Williamson’s transaction cost economics.
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contingencies, 2) write contracts, and 3) enforce these.  This means that parties to an ”investment
game” can simply write contracts contingent on the levels of investment and payoffs. The
implication is that in order to dilute investment incentives, bounded rationality/transaction costs
must somehow mean that one or some combination of 1) to 3) do not hold true, so that, for
example, contracts contingent on investments cannot be written.
The point of contention in the incomplete contracts controversy is whether transaction costs
arising from the inability to perfectly anticipate or describe all relevant contingencies or enforce
contract terms   all of which may be argued to turn on bounded rationality16 constrain the set
of feasible contracting outcomes relative to the complete contracting benchmark.  If this is not
the case, transaction costs (bounded rationality) do not suffice to establish the possibility of
inefficient investment patterns.  Therefore, they do  not suffice to establish a role for ownership,
and in turn for a theory of the boundaries of the firm.17
The argument builds on the assumption in the incomplete contract approach that although
valuations may not be verifiable, they may still be observable by the parties.  This implies that
trade can be conditioned on message games between the parties.  These games are designed ex
ante in such a way that they can effectively describe ex post (where bargaining is efficient) all
the trades that were not described ex ante.  A further crucial step in the argument is accepting the
typical contract theory assumption that parties allocate property rights and choose investments so
that their expected utilities are maximized, knowing (at least probabilistically) how payoffs relate
to allocations of property rights and levels of investment (i.e., they can perform “dynamic
programming”).  Given this, Maskin and Tirole (1999) provide sufficient conditions under which
the undescribability of contingencies does not restrict the payoffs that can be achieved.  This is
their ”irrelevance of transaction costs” theorem.18
Summing Up: Is Bounded Rationality “Irrelevant” in Organizational Economics?
There are further rounds to the debate than what is summarized here (e.g., Hart and Moore
1999). However, it is not necessary to go into these to see that the debate has potentially far-
reaching implications for the use of bounded rationality in the economics of organization. Thus,
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 In the latter case (non-verifiability), it is the enforcing party, such as a judge, that is boundedly  rational.
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 That is, within the particular set-ups adopted in contract theory.
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 To get an idea of their reasoning, consider the following simple example (from Tirole 1999).  An agent attempts
to produce an innovation (of positive value, V) for a principal.  The agent incurs unobserved disutility of effort, g (e)
(with the usual assumptions on partial derivatives) and e is normalized to be the probability of making an innovation
that is useful to the (risk-neutral) principal, so that the first-best effort level satisfies g’ (e) = V.  The agent incurs
effort at stage 1.  At stage 2 the parties observe whether a useful innovation resulted from the agent’s efforts.
Assuming that the fact that the agent has produced an innovation of value V is verifiable, the optimal contract
stipulates a reward, y, which fully determines the agent’s incentives and is payable to him if he produces an
innovation of value V.  Otherwise, he receives 0 (i.e., the contract is a forcing contract, so the agent is also risk-
neutral).  In the absence of discounting, the optimal reward, y*, is given by max { e[V-y]} s.t. g’ (e) = y.
                                                           {e,y}
The solution satisfies 0 < y* < V, so that the principal trades off a high probability of discovery (high reward) and a
low rent for the agent (low reward).   If the parties cannot describe the innovation in the contract  that is, if
indescribable contingencies are involved  , it may happen that the agent delivers an innovation of 0 value.  The
problem is then to design a mechanism that elicits the value of the innovation to the principal while not describing it
ex ante, and, if possible, obtains the same pay-off outcome as when the innovation is ex ante describable.  Such a
mechanism may be a very simple public contract (i.e., the contract is lodged with an arbitrator or a court) that
stipulates that 1) the agent describes the technique she has discovered and wants to transfer to the principal, 2) the
principal then either accepts (paying y = λV,  0  ≤ λ ≤ 1) or turns it down (paying nothing), and 3) the contract
cannot be renegotiated.
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Maskin and Tirole (1999) show that there is no logical inconsistency involved in assuming that
payoffs are fully foreseeable, yet parties are ignorant about the sources of that utility. If you like,
Savage and Simon are compatible.19  However, they also show that very little, and perhaps no,
economic content is added by introducing considerations of bounded rationality.  Note that the
Maskin and Tirole critique is also potentially damning for transaction cost economics to the
extent that it relies on a substantively rational story of the design of efficient governance
structures and to the extent that misaligned investment incentives are crucial here, too.
It is clearly not warranted to generalize from a single episode in an ongoing theoretical
discussion that has not yet reached a definitive conclusion.  However, in the light of the debate, it
is tempting to make the conjecture that the reason why the modern economics of organization
has not yet succeeded in providing a convincing explanation of the key issues of economic
organization, particularly the boundaries of the firm, is that it fundamentally stays close to the
basic complete contracting model and allows for very little room for bounded rationality. Thus,
while the treatment of bounded rationality in the modern economics of organization is
completely different from that of the organizational capabilities approach, the treatments in both
theories mean that they have difficulties addressing key issues of economic organization.  The
other side of the coin is that the Maskin and Tirole argument may be taken as an invitation to
make more room for bounded rationality in the economics of organization (cf. also Radner
1996).  Thus, one may postulate that the parties to a contract cannot foresee, even
probabilistically, their payoffs; this assumption ruins the Maskin and Tirole argument.
However, they may expect that their payoffs are above a threshold level, and make a satisficing
governance choice on this basis.   Rather than pursuing this approach, in the following section I
sketch, in an admittedly highly speculative and sketchy manner, a different way of making more
room for bounded rationality.
IV. Bounded Rationality and Economic Organization:  Where A Different
Approach May Begin
The argument in this section is that there is another strategy for incorporating bounded
rationality in the theory of economic organization than trying to smuggle bounded rationality in
through the backdoor by ad hoc restrictions on the contracting space that agents confront or by
assimilating it under organizational routines.  This is to follow a program of 1) taking seriously
the massive body of research in psychology and cognitive science on biases to human cognition
and judgment, 2) build on this in the sense of identifying regularities with respect to in which
ways human decision-making differs from the Savage model, and 3) examine their implications
for transaction costs and, hence, for comparative contracting.   Such an approach avoids starting
the analysis of individual and organizational behavior and organization from aggregate concepts,
such as routines and organizational capabilities (in contrast to the organizational capabilities
approach). It places individually boundedly rational behavior centerstage, instead of keeping it in
the background (as in organizational economics).  It builds on regularities identified in
experimental research and thus provides a rich, empirically informed account of behavior (in
contrast to the economics of organization).  Finally, it is consistent with the fundamentals of the
economics of organization, that is, an economizing orientation, a comparative contractual
perspective, and an emphasis on transaction costs as key to the explanation of economic
organization.
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 However, as Kreps (1996: 565) laconically observes in a comment on Maskin and Tirole, ”… not everything that
is logically consistent is credulous.”  See Foss (2001) for further discussion.
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A Modeling Approach
Systematic research on human cognition has been going on for at least one hundred years.
However, it is perhaps particularly in the last two or three decades that strong and cumulative
experimental work has revealed that 1) the human capacity to process information is quite
limited, 2) humans try to economize on cognitive effort by relying on short-cuts, and 3) because
of 1) and 2), as well as other factors, such as the influence of emotions on cognition, human
cognition and judgment is subject to a wide range of biases and errors.  Economists of
organization have taken an interest in 1), have been somewhat less occupied with 2), and have
almost entirely neglected 3).20  They have done so at their peril, as the fruitful work, centering on
3) and performed by economists working on behavioral finance, law and economics and cost-
benefit analysis suggests.   However, the argument here is that taking fuller account of the
relevant psychological and cognitive literature will produce additional insight into economic
organization in a way that is entirely consistent with the basic explanatory thrust of the
economics of organization.  A similar argument has recently been sketched by Williamson
(1998); in fact, much of the following may be seen as an attempt to unfold aspects of this paper.
Drawing in particular on Rabin (1998), he argues, as above, that the many ramifications of
bounded rationality should be explored with a view to first identify those regularities in decision-
making that differ from the classical model of von Neumann-Morgenstern-Savage, then work out
the implications of these regularities for efficient organization, and finally fold these into the
organizational design (Williamson 1998:18).  This will provide a fuller picture of the extent to
which “… organization can and should be regarded as an instrument for utilizing varying
cognitive and behavioral propensities to best advantage” (Williamson 1998: 12).
As I interpret Williamson’s program, it is a call for exploring “mechanisms” (Hedström and
Swedberg 1998), that is, causal connections that may or may not be triggered in specific
situations,  rather than for searching for general regularities.   To be more concrete, it is a call for
exploring how a specific manifestation of bounded rationality  such as, say, reference level
biases   translate into transaction costs confronted by agents in a specific setting, and how this
influences the contract or governance structure chosen by these agents to regulate their trade.21
This is not necessarily to say that one ends up with a mass of extremely partial models of
strongly limited applicability, that is, with “history” rather than “theory.” Insights of rather
general applicability may follow. For example, Babcock and Loewenstein (1998) argue that self-
serving biases are likely to be a very frequent determinants of a specific type of transaction costs,
namely bargaining impasse.
Overall Implications
A limitation of Williamson’s (1998) paper (if not of the program he suggests) is that he seems
mostly intent on demonstrating that the many findings on biased cognition  and judgment and
strange preferences are entirely consistent with “[t]he transaction cost economics triple for
describing human actors  bounded rationality, farsighted contracting, and opportunism,” rather
than inquiring into how specifically these findings may add to and complement the transaction
cost economics approach.  On a basic level, organizations may indeed be instruments for
utilizing varying cognitive and behavioral propensities to “best advantage.”  Much of that can be
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  It is far from obvious why this is so.  In Foss (2001) I speculate that it may have to do with Simon’s
overwhelming influence on those economists who have addressed economic organization.  Simon never really took
much of an interest in cognitive biases and the like.
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 Formal work in contract economics in such a vein has recently commenced (e.g., Mookerjee 1998; Carmichael
and MacLeod 1999).
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accomplished simply through specialization and assignment.  This is, of course, entirely
consistent with organizational economics. However, organizations also economize on bounded
rationality by curbing the less fortunate manifestations and consequences of biases and errors in
decision making, time-variant preferences, and the like.22  For example, as the student of the
human resource management literature will know, performance evaluation in firms is undertaken
not so much for the purpose of tying merit pay to performance, as for the purpose of providing
employees with feedback on strengths and weaknesses  including behavioral aspects that are
manifestations of bounded rationality.23
Thus, a first preliminary implication (rather, claim) is that paying more attention to such
behavioral aspects allows for a richer understanding of the managerial task.  In addition to
performance assessment, the tasks of the tasks of the manager may also include correcting biases
in judgment, curbing problems of procrastination and impulsiveness, influencing organizational
expectations, and manipulating preferences.24  In addition, this helps to resolve some empirical
puzzles that confront organizational economics.  For example, in many work situations, precise
signals on output are available, yet monitoring still takes place.  Office workers may thus be
supervised although it is trivial to count the number of forms they have processed at the end of
the day.  It seems unrealistic to argue that some random and unobservable factor should
intervene in the work process, shifting too much risk on to the agent.  A more realistic
explanation is lack of self-discipline in the performance of a boring job (Rabin 1998).  Thus,
although the basic thrust of organizational economics is likely to survive confrontation with
psychological findings on bounded rationality, it is also likely to be changed as a result of this
confrontation, perhaps quite strongly.   In order to see this, it is necessary to go into more detail
with respect to the nature of biases to rationality, cognition and preferences.
Biases to Rationality, Cognition, and Preferences
Most of mainstream economics involves uniform and perfect cognition.  For example, the
common prior assumption is routinely made in much of the economics of organization (Radner
1986).  Until approximately 1980 few economists criticized (noticed?) the uniform and perfect
cognition postulate. Since then the massive and rapidly accumulating literature in cognitive
science, cognitive and social psychology and experimental economics on biases to rationality,
cognition and preferences has been not only cited by economists, but also increasingly used (see
Rabin 1998 for a survey). Strictly speaking, not all of this literature is about bounded rationality.
For example, work in psychology and experimental economics on “social” (i.e., other-regarding)
preferences may lie outside its orbit.  On the other hand, much of the literature exclusively
concerns cognitive issues, such as the systematic violations of the standard theory of behavior
under uncertainty that real people engage in. This literature would be considered by most to be
directly about bounded rationality.  However, in actuality the boundaries between cognition and
preference are blurred, and an important part of the literature lies on those blurred boundaries
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 Fransman (1994) argues that a concern with bounded rationality makes “economizing” close to being
meaningless, an argument that seems to be founded on interpreting “economizing” to be identical to the charicature
of fully-informed maximization.
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 Consistent with this, much of the literature on cognitive biases demonstrate that biases and errors may strongly
diminish in importance as a result of instruction, that is, having one’s errors pointed out.
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 Another implication is that more room is created for ex post governance than is usual in the economics of
organization: If indeed agents cannot perfectly foresee all contingencies and calculate the payoffs of their relations
or if their estimates of these payoffs are biased, unintended consequences are likely to follow.  In turn, this may give
rise to haggling, as the parties try to adjust.  The costs of haggling may be reduced by means of ex post mechanisms,
such as the authority relation.
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(e.g., March 1999).25 Thus, in the following, I deliberately and rather indiscriminately mix
preference and cognition when discussing various manifestations bounded rationality. Here is a
telegraphically stated and arguably incomplete catalogue of biases that, I shall argue, are relevant
to the understanding of economic organization.
The availability heuristic  that is, people tend to think that events are more probable if they
can recall incidents of their occurrence.  An example is that people typically think that more
words, on any given page, will end with the letters “ing” than have “n” as the second-to-last
letter (although clearly this is not possible). The availability heuristic has been argued to be
particular relevant to the understanding of risk assessments (Sunstein 1999), particularly since
the availability heuristic implies that risk assessments are likely to be strongly conditioned by
social, particularly informational, forces.
Reference level biases  this is a family of biases that includes loss aversion (aka the status quo
bias), the endowment effect, the diminishing sensitivity bias, and the self-serving bias. Common
to these is that they all involve a reference point. The most basic one is arguably loss aversion.
Under loss aversion, a loss relative to the status quo is seen as more undesirable than a gain
relative to the same status quo is seen as desirable. A closely related bias is the endowment
effect, that is, once a person comes to possess a good, he will value it more than before he
possessed it.  Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) empirically examine the implication of the
standard assumptions of economic theory that (when income effects are 0 or small) a person’s
maximum willingness to pay for a good should be roughly the same as the minimum
compensation demanded for the same good.  They find that contrary to theoretical expectation
and controlling for strategic behavior and transaction costs, there are systematic differences
between these numbers, in the sense that when people are given goods their valuation of those
goods increases strongly and instantaneously. The diminishing sensitivity bias implies that the
marginal effects of changes in well being are greater when change is close to one’s reference
level than for changes farther away (Rabin 1998).  Finally, the self-serving bias is essentially the
conflation of what is fair with what benefits oneself (Babcock and Loewenstein 1997).   Thus,
people systematically overestimate their own contribution to joint tasks.
Adaptive preferences  that is, the phenomenon that preferences, such as risk preferences
(March and Shapira 1992; March 1996), adapt to experience in a manner that roughly
corresponds to people coming to prefer what they experience. This may produce intertemporal
inconsistency in revealed choices.  Adaptive preferences are evidently closely related to
reference level biases, and may to some extent be seen as a dynamic version of reference level
biases.
Preference reversal  that is, the quite pervasive phenomenon that people are inconsistent
when considering two gambles of equal expected value, one gamble having a high probability of
winning a moderate stake and the other a low probability of winning a larger stake.  The finding
is that many persons who prefer the former over the latter when required to choose between
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 In his overview paper, Rabin (1998) explicitly tries to distinguish relevant psychological contributions on the
basis of whether they relate to “biases in judgment” (i.e., cognition) or to “preferences.”  However, as he admits, the
distinction is far from watertight; for example, framing effects  “… may in fact partially determine a person’s
preferences (1998: 37; emph. in original).  See also Lindenberg (1988) for a related point.  If one thinks of bounded
rationality in a general Simonian way as an imperfect ability to perceive, learn about, compare, remember, and order
alternatives “strange” (e.g., time variant or context dependent) preferences are to be expected. For example, March
(1996) argues that the fact that people exhibit greater risk aversion for gains than for losses in many situations (i.e., a
risk preference) may reflect accumulated learning (i.e., a cognitive activity) rather than given utility functions.
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gambles, actually put a higher minimum selling price on the latter than the former, when they are
asked to evaluate the very same gambles.   Preference reversal may be seen as an instance of a
broader class of biases, namely framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman 1986), which refers to
the general phenomenon that people often lack stable preferences that are robust to different
ways of eliciting those preferences (Rabin 1998).
Biases in the Context of Economic Organization: Some Impressionistic Examples
As Williamson (1998) argues, biases to rationality, cognition, and preferences are mitigated to a
large extent by organization.  This is because organization has recourse to specialization, which
allows for economizing with cognitive effort.  That does not make these biases irrelevant to the
study of organization.  On the contrary, since specialization cannot cope with all biases, recourse
to additional organizational measures is likely to be necessary.  In order to see this, it is
necessary to inquire into how biases affect economic organization.   One take on this issue is to
think of biases  as influencing economic outcomes because they influence bargaining
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1990; Babcock and Loewenstein 1997).  In such a perspective,
biases may be viewed as determinants of bargaining outcomes on par with asymmetric
information, strategic behavior and time preference.  For example, as Babcock and Loewenstein
(1997) argue, the self-serving bias may drastically narrow the contract zone, and perhaps
eliminate it altogether.
To be more concrete, what people believe that they deserve in a bargaining situation may be
subject to reference level biases.   In turn, reference levels may change over time as a result of
the phenomenon of adaptive preference (e.g., in a repeated bargaining situation).  The
comparisons people make when evaluating their gains and losses from bargaining, and how they
evaluate the same offers in different contexts (e.g., as made by different people), may be subject
to framing effects.  In the context of economic organization, biases may thus influence how
much employees expect to capture of the firm’s surplus (and therefore how much they are going
to invest in augmenting their human capital), how competitive threats are perceived, how the
gains from trade in inputs markets will be shared, etc. In the context of economic organization,
biases may influence both explicit contract terms and the bargaining games that take place in the
context of relations where contracting is incomplete (i.e., ex post renegotiation games).  The
ramifications are clearly many and complicated; only a few will be considered here.
Example 1: Loss aversion, employee expectations and strategic change.  In order to spell out
some implications of loss aversion, imagine a dramatic change in corporate strategy so that the
focal firm withdraws from a number of markets, downsizing and concentrating on core business.
Of course, many employees in addition to those that may be laid off will suffer a loss of utility as
a result of this.  Since the change is likely to be at least partly negotiated between the various
stakeholders of the firm, management and owners are likely to offer various side-payments to
reduce these losses of utility.  Strategic behavior is likely to complicate the ensuing bargaining.
However, the phenomena of loss aversion and adaptive preferences are likely to further
complicate bargaining games.
First, loss aversion implies that the proposed strategic change will involve a mixture of painful
losses and less-pleasurable gains so that people will tend to resist change.  Inertia is predicted by
loss-aversion alone. Second, in an employee relationship, employees develop implicit and
explicit expectations to the contract governing the relationship, and particularly to the benefits
that they believe they deserve under the implicit contract, that is, their “entitlements” (Heath et
al. 1993). There is psychological evidence that people tend to be systematically biased in their
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estimates of their entitlements.  More specifically, these are perceived as richer (people think
they contribute more than they do) and more systematic (because rare events are often given
probability zero, the consistency of others’ behavior is over-estimated) than they would be to a
neutral observer (idem.).  The combined implication of loss aversion and the development of
expectations with respect to entitlements is that side-payments are likely to be much larger than
an “objective” evaluation would suggest.
Various implications follow.  First, the economics of organization implicitly claims that
organizations are plastic. Notions of complementarity between elements of the organization and
strategic behavior may complicate this, but provided that organizations can be changed in a
systemic fashion and informational asymmetries do not pose too much of a problem, there
should not be any remaining problems of organizational change. However, the phenomena of
loss aversion and adaptive preferences are relevant mechanisms that may cause substantial
organizational inertia and make organizational change more costly than an organizational
economics analysis would indicate. Thus, although alternatives to existing organizational
arrangements can be imagined, the set of alternatives that can be implemented with net gains is
further circumscribed.    The other side of the coin of adaptive preferences and loss aversion
suggest is that an important part of ex post governance is the management of the formation of the
expectations of those agents with which the firm bargains over inputs and outputs.  The ultimate
sharing of value will not just be a matter of the “objective” contribution of each agent, but will
also reflect players’ perception of their “legitimate” entitlements.  Management and leadership
have an important role in influencing those perceptions.
Example 2: Leadership behavior and the availability heuristic.  The previous example indicates
that an implication of the combined effects of loss aversion and adaptive preferences is to make
any status quo salient.  However, the availability heuristic may counteract that tendency. The
fact that the availability heuristic is likely to be very strongly socially conditioned only helps
here.  For example, public announcements by a CEO that the competitive situation faced by the
firm is threatening may create informational externalities, because the announcement is taken as
a relevant signal by employees.  When there is little information about the true state of
competition, such externalities may create informational cascades (Sunstein 1999).  If further
this announcement is combined with a call for wage reductions, there is potentially ample room
for the kind of employer opportunism discussed by Dow (1987) but neglected in most of the
economics of organization.  Thus, one possible application of the availability heuristic is to
broaden the role of opportunism in organizational economics.26
Example 3: Context-dependent risk-preference. An implication of preference reversal and
adaptive preferences is that risk-preference is likely to be context-dependent.  Specifically,
March and Shapira (1992) argue that risk-taking is influenced by danger (threats to survival),
slack (more slack leads to more risk-taking), aspiration levels (people are risk-seeking under the
target level and risk-averse above), whose resources are at risk, and past experience.   This
suggests that the efficiency of incentive contracts, which partly relies on shifting risks between
parties, is context dependent, and that some kinds of incentive contracts may in some contexts
have perverse consequences.  For example, consider a firm that not only falls much below its
own aspiration levels, but also begins to confront difficulties with sales, and ultimately of paying
creditors. In this situation, managers may, because of the context-dependence of risk preference,
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  See also Lindenberg (1988) for the point that behavioral concerns may broaden the notion of opportunism.
Thus, Lindenberg argues that framing effects may lead to myopia that may increase the threat of opportunism in
contractual relations.
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want to assume more risk than would be sensible to a neutral observer. If they have been
equipped with incentive contracts in the form of golden parachutes, their incentives to actually
assume excess risks will be strengthened.  Incentive contracts that have not been designed with
an eye to the context-dependence of risk-preference may therefore misstate the “true” risk-
allocation inherent in the contract, given the various states of nature that may be realized.
Example 4: Groups and Organization Design.  The use of group-based decision-making is an
increasingly important aspect of modern organization.  Arguably, the use of groups is partly
determined by the phenomenon  well known to social psychologists  that group decisions
differ from individual decisions in an organizational context and that groups can change the
behavior of their members.  The positive aspect of this is that groups may give rise to distinct
synergies, stemming from improved problem-solving.  The improved problem-solving that is
available to teams/groups has been strongly emphasized in, for example, the Total Quality
Management movement. Thus, adherents of TQM advocate extensive delegation of decision
rights to groups to promote a closer co-location of decision rights and specific, local knowledge
and a faster and more efficient decision-making process.
Although group interaction may thus yield certain types of informational rents, a rich literature in
social psychology indicates that groups have biases of their own.  The costs associated with such
biases may offset potential benefits.  For example, a rather robust phenomenon is the “risk-shift
phenomenon” in which group compromise leads to the adoption of a most risky common view.
This may well be related to the “groupthink” phenomenon, that is, the tendency of the sharing of
mental models to lead to incomplete surveys of alternatives and objectives and failures to fully
examine the risks of available alternatives, in turn leading to excessive optimism and risk-taking
and a suppression of “heretic” ideas.  Organizational economists have known at least since
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) that groups/teams may fall victim to free-rider problems, and that
this may help explaining aspects of the organization of firms.  As the above indicates, free-rider
problems are not the only problems of the current trend of disaggregating  corporations intp
smaller teams. Among the relevant costs of increased disaggregation are the potential costs of
promoting groupthink-phenomena within groups/teams (although this may mean that
corporation-wide groupthink may be reduced).
Summing Up
Many other similar examples could be constructed based on the many cognitive biases that have
not been reported here.27 Moreover, it would also be possible to examine implications for other
aspects of economic organization than internal organization.  However, the examples hopefully
serve to indicate the main thrust of the argument: It is possible to tell stories about economic
organization that pay much more attention to bounded rationality  in the form of work in
social and cognitive psychology and cognitive science on biases and strange preferences  but
still does not fundamentally break with explanatory fundamentals of organizational economics,
that is, keeps intact an economizing orientation, methodological individualism, a focus on the
costs of transacting, and comparative contracting.   The above examples indicate that this kind of
research will enrichen the understanding of the sources of organizational inertia and the barriers
to organizational change, the analysis of opportunism, the design of incentive contracts, and
organizational design.
                                                
27
 Examples may include the effect of frequent performance evalution on the framing of decision situations and the
effect of framing on risk preferences.
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On the overall level, taking account of “thicker” notions of bounded rationality than is standard
fare in organizational economics and the organizational capabilities approach means that there
are certain research heuristics in the economics of organization that becomes problematic,
notably the use of rational expectations/dynamic programming.  On the other new heuristics may
be added, such as the idea that biases to cognition and judgment, etc. may be analyzed as
determinants of transaction costs on a par with the usual determinants identified in the
economics of organization.   With respect to the outcomes of theorizing, the conjecture here is
that the introduction of biases to cognition and judgment means that the set of feasible outcomes
is different from what is described in the economics of organization, for example, because
reference level biases constrain this set.  As the above sketchy examples indicate, this may help
adding more managerial relevance to organizational economics.
V. Conclusions
This paper is founded on the observation that although quite a number of contributors to the
theory of economic organization have agreed on the importance of bounded rationality to their
subject area, upon closer inspection it turns out that there is little agreement on 1) what exactly is
the nature of bounded rationality, 2) how it should be modeled, and 3) its implications for the
behavior and organization of firms.28 Perhaps because there is little clarity with respect to the
nature and modeling of bounded rationality, bounded rationality, in the actual practice of those
economists that are taken up with firms and other organizations, tends to step into the
background.  For this reason, its implications for the organization and behavior of firms are also
quite unclear.
Thus, I have argued that  somewhat contrary to the way in which approaches such as
transaction cost economics and evolutionary economics are usually portrayed (e.g., by Augier,
Kreiner and March 2000) , the role of bounded rationality in both organizational economics
and in the organizational capabilities approach is very much a background one.  It serves to make
plausible the notions of incomplete contracts and organizational routines.  Its role is arguably
more rhetorical than substantive. In both transaction cost economics and the organizational
capabilities approach, boundedly rational individual behavior is in actuality not modeled. I have
argued that this results in certain explanatory problems for these approaches, particularly with
respect to addressing issues such as the boundaries and internal organization of firms.
However, one thing is pointing out this difficulties; another things is devising concrete remedies.
I have suggested, albeit in a highly impressionistic way, that the rich literature on cognitive
biases and the like may be an appropriate place to start.  Many of the relevant biases, etc. are
well established in experimental research and have rather direct implications for organization
and contract design.  They allow for an empirically grounded understanding of a neglected set of
contractual hazards and frictions, and therefore a richer understanding of the determinants of
transaction costs.  By means of exemplification, I have argued that such an approach has real
implications for economic organization, more specifically internal organization. Because of
space limitations, implications for issues relating to the boundaries and existence of firms, and
wider issues of contract design, have not been developed.  Future work will address these issues.
                                                
28
  Although this paper is not the first to make this kind of observations (e.g., Casson and Wadeson 1997), many of
those who write about bounded rationality proceed as if the problems were non-existent.  See, for example, the
December 2000 Special issue of Industrial and Corporate Change.
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